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WIFE'S RIGHT TO EJECT HUSBAND WHEN MARITAL
HOME IS HER PROPERTY
Should a wife who has left her husband without justification be
allowed to sue him in ejectment in an effort to evict him from the
marital home, which is her own separate property? That this problem is one which often occurs today and will recur with greater frequency in the future cannot be doubted in view of the increasing
divorce rate and ownership of property by married women. In Owens
v. Owens1 the Supreme Court of Delaware held that an erring wife
could eject her husband from the marital home.
In the Owens case plaintiff before marriage owned certain real
estate upon which she desired to build a three-unit apartment house.
She contracted with the defendant, a building contractor. As the
construction progressed, so did the relationship of the parties, terminating with the completion of the building and full payment in the
Spring and with their marriage in the Summer. During the construction period the defendant, in anticipation of the future marriage, improved the plaintiff's property in order to make it practicable as their
future abode. 2 After the marriage the parties moved into one of the
apartments and established their home. Marital difficulties soon developed, and within two years the plaintiff left the apartment and
began this suit in equitable ejectment 3 to evict her husband from her
separately owned property. Although the plaintiff contended that she
left because of cruel treatment, the trial court found that the wife
was at fault in the separation, stating that she had no legal or practical 4 grounds for leaving her husband and that the marital difficulties
were due to her "unjustified activities and accusations." 5
The trial court held that under the Delaware Married Woman's
Property Act 6 the plaintiff could not maintain her suit unless she
I149 A.2d 320 (Del. 1959).

2

Id. at 321. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the trial court's finding
that the improvements by the husband were not entirely in the nature of a gift to
the wife, and allowed him a lien on her property for reimbursement.
3149 A.2d at 322, 324. The Supreme Court of Delaware reaffirmed the Delaware
rule that a wife may not sue her husband at law, but may sue him in equity to
enforce certain property rights. The court held that the wife had a substantive right
to evict her husband and that the equity court cannot refuse to hear her case on
the "clean hands" doctrine merely because she was at fault. For a similar procedural discussion see Ireland v. Ireland, 244 Pa. 489, go At. 911 (1914).
'143 A.2d r23, 125 (Del. Ch. 1958).
5
lbid.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 311 (1953).

196o]

CASE COMMENTS

149

justifiably left the premises. 7 The court, in disallowing the plaintiff's
suit as disruptive of the marital relationship, stated the family unity
theory:
"The cases supporting this view are-based upon the reasoning
that the emphasis must be on the marital domicile aspect of the
problem rather than mere separate ownership. This is so because
marriage contemplates that the parties will live together and
consequently a rule should be adopted which favors the continuance rather than the destruction of that relationship, at least
where the husband is without fault." s
The Delaware Supreme Court placed a liberal interpretation upon
the Delaware Married Woman's Property Act and held that the
guilty wife could maintain her suit,9 stating that to hold otherwise
"would be to write into our act a judicially created exception to its
terms."' 0 The court, doubting the wisdom of a rule preventing the
wife from suing in hopes of bringing about a reconciliation and preserving the marriage unity, stated that:
"It would hardly seem ....

even if the economic coercion

of an inability to obtain possession of her own property led
to the errant wife's return to cohabitation, that her return would
in fact be a reconciliation based upon love and affection and
thus a real preservation of the marital relationship.""l
The court also felt that a recent statutory amendment allowing divorce
without regard to fault 12 showed that it was not the intention of the
legislature "to compel the continuance of a marital relationship between unwilling parties ....

13

A married woman, as the result of two well established doctrines,
had almost no property rights at common law. The first was the doctrine of the husband's jus mariti, or estate by the marital right;14 the
7143 A.2d at 126.

3Ibid.
'149 A.2d 32o (Del. 1959).

Id. at 323.
11Id. at 323-24.
"Del. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 1522 (1953), as amended, 51 Del. Laws ch. 27 (1957).
This amendment allows a divorce "when husband and wife have voluntarily lived
separate and apart, without any cohabitation for three consecutive years prior to
the filing of the divorce action and such separation is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation." The parties .in the Owens case could not have availed
themselves of this amendment, for at the time of this decision they had only been
separated 28 V2 months.
2349

A.2d at 324.

2'By virtue of the estate of the marital right, a husband acquired, at the time
of and by the right of marriage, a life estate in any estate of freehold owned
by his wife. The husband's estate, said to be jure uxoris (by right of the wife), was
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second was the doctrine that the wife was not sni juris and therefore
could not sue or be sued. 15 Equity developed the married woman's equitable separate estate 16 in order to circumvent the harsh principle of the
husband's marital right estate, and permitted a married woman to
sue even her husband with respect to her separate estate.17 This was the
state of the law until the nineteenth century and the passage of the
Married Woman's ProtSerty Acts. 18 The acts vary a great deal, but
generally grant married women substantial property rights with respect to their separately owned realty.' 9 Many of the acts are broad
in their terms, but generally they are merely narrow privileging acts
itself a freehold estate and entitled him to the rents and profits from her land. It
became a life estate of more permanent tenure upon the birth of issue and was called
an estate by curtesy. Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations §§ 32-33 (1931);
Moynihan, Preliminary Survey of the Law of Real Property 25 (1940); 2 Tiffany,
Real Property § 484 (3d ed. 1939); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 167 (1935);
McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses And Use During Marriage Of The
Matrimonial Home Owned By The Other, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 447 (1957); Rapacz, Progress
of the Property Law Relating to Married Women, ii U. Kan. City L. Rev. 173
(1943). For additional discussion and cases see 26 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife § 55
(1940); 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife §§ 21-22 (1944).
nAt common law one spouse could not maintain an action against the other,
largely due to the theory of marital unity which treated them as one in the eyes
of the law. Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations § 54 (1931); 3 Vernier, American
Family Laws §§ 79, 18o (1935); McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses And Use
During Marriage Of The Matrimonial Home Owned By The Other, 2 Vill. L.
Rev. 447 (1957); Note, i Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 89 (1939). For additional discussion
and cases see 27 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife §§ 584, 599 (1940); 41 C.J.$. Husband
and Wife §§ 389, 393-96 (1944).
' 8The "equitable separate estate" was created by conveying land to the wife for
her sole and separate use, and such land was free from the marital right estate of her
husband as well as from his legal control and use. Madden, Persons and Domestic
Relations §§ 36-41 (1931); 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 485 (3d ed. 1939); 3 Vernier,
American Family Laws § 167 (1935); McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses
And Use During Marriage Of The Matrimonial Home Owned By The Other, 2 Vill.
L. Rev. 447 (1957); Repacz, Progress of the Property Law Relating to Married Women,
ii U. Kan. City L. Rev. 173 (1943). For additional discussion and cases see 41 C.J.S.
Husband
and Wife §§ 29, 226-31, 395 (1944).
17
See note 16 supra.
5
The general purpose and effect of these acts has been to grant to married
women the right to own and control property called their Statutory Separate
Estate, and to sue and be sued at law as if they were unmarried. Madden, Persons
and Domestic Relations §§ 42-43 (1931); 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 486 ( 3 d ed. 1939);
3 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ 167-68, 179, 18o (1935); McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses And Use During Marriage Of The Matrimonial Home
Owned By The Other, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 447 (1957); Rapacz, Progress of the Property
Law Relating to Married Women, ii U. Kan. City L. Rev. 173 (1943). For additional
discussion and cases see 27 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife §§ 587-88, 599, 6o4 (1940); 41
C.J.S. Husband and Wife §§ 166, 232-53, 389, 393-96, 406 (1944). For an excellent discussion of the development of the wife's separate estate and her rights therein, see
Wood v. Wood, 83 N.Y. (38 Sickels) 575 (1881).
"See note 18 supra.
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which have often been strictly construed because they were in derogation of the common law. However, the modem trend has been to
broaden and liberalize them, both by amendment and court decision. 20
A number of situations can exist when the wife seeks to eject her
husband. When the parties are divorced, the courts are agreed that
the wife may eject her former husband. 21 Similarly, the wife may maintain her suit when the parties never used the property as their home.22
While the wife may not eject her husband 23 in a few western states,
where a statutory homestead right creates an actual estate in land,
the homestead laws of most states do not affect the wife's ejectment
suit.24 The suit has been denied when the parties were living together,25
but allowed when the parties were living apart because of the husband's fault.26 The most difficult problem is whether a wife may sue
her husband in ejectment for possession of the marital home when she
is herself at fault, as in the Owens case.
wibid.
-Gummison v. Johnson, 149 Minn. 329, 183 N.W. 515 (1921); Kern v. Field, 68
Minn. 317, 71 N.W. 393 (1887); Humphreys v. Strong, 141 Va. 146, 126 S.E. 194
(1925); Arp v. Jacobs, 3 Wyo. 489, 27 Pac. 8oo (1891). However, the wife was refused
her suit in Redfern v. Redfern, 38 111. 5o9 (1865), in which the divorce was obtained
because of her adultery. For additional discussion and cases on the general subject
see 26 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife §§ 116, 119-20 (194o); 2 Vernier, American Family
Laws §§ 96-97 (1932). The courts granting the wife her suit have not distinguished
between divorce a vinculo and divorce a mensa et thoro.
2rThe cases are few on this point. Walker v. Walker, 215 Ky. 154, 284 S.W. 1042
(1926); McKendry v. Fessler, 131 Pa. 24, 18 Ati. 1078 (189o). See McCurdy, Property
Torts Between Spouses And Use During Marriage Of The Matrimonial Home
Owned By The Other, 2 Viii. L. Rev. 447 (1957).
nGrace v. Grace, 96 Minn. 294, 1o4 N.W. 969 (1905); Williams v. Williams,
io6 Neb. 584, 184 N.W. 114 (1921); Weatherington v. Smith, 77 Neb. 369, 112 N.W.
566 (1907).
2
-Cook v. Cook, 125 Ala. 583, 27 So. 918 (19oo); Buckingham v. Buckingham,
81 Mich. 89, 45 N.V. 504 (1890). For a discussion and collection of cases on the
homestead problem see 21 A.L.R. 745 (1922). Many of the cases favoring this view
involved divorce and held that a divorce cuts off homestead rights. See note 21
supra.
-Manning v. Manning, 79 N.C. 223 (1878); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 172 Misc. 18,
13 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Marshall v. Marshall, 116 Misc. 249, 190 N.Y.
Supp. 318 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Cipperly v. Cipperly, 104 Misc. 434, 172 N.Y. Supp. 351
(Sup. Ct. 1918); McKendry v. Fessler, 131 Pa. 24, 18 Ad. 1078 (189o) (dictum).
nMcDuff v. McDuff, 45 Cal. App. 53, 87 Pac. 37 (1919); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson,
147 La. 315, 84 So. 794 (1920); Propes v. Propes, 171 Mo. 407, 71 S.W. 685 (19O3);
Sackman v. Sackman, 143 Mo. 576, 45 S.W. 264 (1898); Wood v. Wood, 83 N.Y. (38
Sickels) 575 (1881); Ireland v. Ireland, 244 Pa. 489, 90 AU. 911 (1914); Heckman v.
Heckman, 215 Pa. 203, 64 At. 425 (igo6); McKendry v. Fessler, 131 Pa. 24, 18 Atd.
1078 (189o). For additional discussion and cases see 21 A.L.R. 745 (1922); 1O9 A.L.R.
882 (1937); 27 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife § 6oo (194o). Several of the cases decided in favor of the wife do not seem to consider the fault aspect. Walker v. Walker,
215 Ky. 154, 284 S.W. 1042 (1926); Rudd v. Rudd, 318 Mo. 935, 2 S.W.ad 585 (1927).
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When the language of the married Woman's Property Acts is
broad2 7 in granting the wife property rights and rights of action, the
court allows the wife at fault to sue her husband. 28 The Virginia
statute applied in Edmonds v. Edmonds is an example of such a broad
statute. 29 In Edmonds the wife who was at fault3 0 was suing for possession of the marital home, title to which she had acquired as a gift
from her husband. 31 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in allowing the wife her suit, considered the conflict between the wife's property rights and her husband's marital rights and held that the Virginia
Marred Woman's Property Act had expressly abolished the husband's
marital rights in his wife's land.3 2 The only right the husband still has
with respect to his wife's land is the privilege to enter when she is residing thereon because of his right of access to her.33 In response to the
assertion that the wife's fault should bar her suit, the court said:
"[It] is difficult to see how desertion by the wife of her home
and husband gives the husband the right to occupy the wife's
lands.... His rights are determined by the statute, and not by
the fact as to whether the relations between husband and wife
are friendly or unfriendly, whether they are living together or
apart,4 or whether they separated for good cause or no cause at
all." 3
The Married Woman's Acts of some states are merely narrow
privileging acts which neither expressly grant nor deny the wife specific property rights.3 5 A majority of courts liberally interpret such
7A broad Married Woman's Property Act is one which grants to the wife or
denies to the husband specific rights in express terms. The acts are expressly
liberal and leave little to court interpretation. For example, the Virginia Act
specifically provides that the husband, with the exception of curtesy, shall no longer
have an interst in his wife's land by the marital right. Va. Code Ann. § 55-35 (1959).
2Edmonds v. Edmonds, 139 Va. 652, 124 S.E. 415 (1924); accord, Humphreys v.
Strong, 141 Va. 146, 126 S.E. 194 (1925); Cook v. Cook, 125 Ala. 583, 27 So. 918 (1900),

based upon the Alabama Married Woman's Property Act, Ala. Code tit. 34, §§ 6., 72,
75 (1940).
i39 Va. 652, 124 S.E. 415 (1924). The Edmonds suit was in unlawful detainer,

an action available as a substitute for ejectment to gain possession of property.
'OId. at 419. Even though it appeared from the facts that the wife was at fault,
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals felt that fault was not in issue.
m
Id. at 416.
32Id. at 417. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals indicated that the wife
should win as a matter of law, thus presenting the possibility of a directed verdict
in her favor in Virginia. Id. at 418-19.
3Ibid. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals said that a husband who entered
upon his wife's land against her will or command when she was not occupying it
was a trespasser and could be prosecuted for criminal trespass.
"Id. at 419.
"For examples of narrowly written Married Woman's Property Acts see Del.
Code Ann. tit. 13, § 311 (1953); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 38-1o2 (1949); Mich Comp. Laws
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acts and allow the erring wife to maintain her suit; 36 a minority of
courts strictly construe their acts, thereby barring an ejectment suit by
the wife. 37 An example of the majority view is the New York case of
Minier v. Minier,3s in which the court, in holding that the erring
wife could maintain her suit, said that "in regard to the property,
the relation of husband and wife does not affect it; as to it the parties
are strangers to each other."39
In contrast to this liberal construction are cases such as Kelley v.
Kelley,40 in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court placed a strict
interpretation upon its narrow statute and held that the erring wife
could not sue in ejectment. The court felt that the Rhode Island Act 4 '
was only directory and not mandatory, stating in addition that it
merely invoked a change in procedure and not in substance.4 2 In so
holding, the court said:
"A literal construction of the act would authorize any proceedceeding against the husband which the wife could bring against
any other person. There is nothing in the act to show an intention by the Legislature to so modify the marriage relation as
to authorize an action of this character against her husband." 43
44
The Kelley interpretation was based upon the family unity theory,
which is founded on the premise that the wife, if she is denied her
ejectment suit, may be induced to return to her husband. This theory

§ 557-1 (1948); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Laws §§ 50, 51, 57 (1959); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
417, §§ 1, 14 (1938); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6oi (1955); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4614
(1948); V.Va. Code Ann. §§ 4731-32 (1955).

md
Crater v. Crater, 1 x8 Ind. 521, 21 N.E. 290 (1889); Buckingham v. Buckingham,
81 Mich. 89, 45 N-. 504 (1890); Minier v. Minier, 4 N.Y. (4 Lan.) 421 (Sup. Ct. 1870);
Hall v. Hall, 241 S.V.2d 919 (Tenn. 1951); Bennett v. Bennett, 37 W. Va. 396, i6 S.E.
638 (1892) (dicta). See also Heard v. Heard, 272 SAV.501 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), which
allowed a wife relief in the nature of an injunction from her husband's interference
with her control of her property, while denying her a divorce. For additional discussion and cases see 21 A.L.R. 745 (1922); iog A.L.R. 882 (1937); 27 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife § 6oo (1940); 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 280 (1944).
-"Kelley v. Kelley, 51 R.I. 173, 153 Ad. 314 (1931). See also 2x A.L.R. 745 (1922);
1o9 A.L.R. 882 (1937); 27 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife § 6oo (1940); 41 C.JS. Husband
and Wife § 280 (1944).
'14 N.Y. (4 Lans.) 421 (Sup. Ct. 1870).

1I*d. at

422.

1051
R.I. 173, 153 At. 314 (1931). For a brief treatment of the Kelley case see
Rapacz, Progress of the Property Law Relating to Married Women, ii U. Kan. City
L. Rev. (1943).
,"R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 417, §§ 1, 14 (1938).
6-153 Ad. at 315.
"Ibid. For a recent case, mentioning Kelley but refusing to follow it, see Hall
v. Hall, 241 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. 1951).
"See note 40 supra. This concept also served as the basis for the trial court
decision in Owens. Owens v. Owens, 143 A.2d 123 (Del. Ch. 1958).
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can be used most effectively when the wife is at fault, because it can
be buttressed by the "clean hands" maxim of equity. The argument
was comprehensively stated in the Kelley case, the court saying:
"The law favors the marital relation and the permanence
of the family. The voluntary separation without consent and
without justification of one spouse from the other is a legal desertion, which, if continued, is a ground for divorce. The relief
sought in the case at bar consists not only of putting the wife
in possession, but in expelling the husband from his wife's
house, which is the lawful home of both husband and wife....
The wife still has the legal possession and also the right of occupancy if she wished to exercise it. Neither husband nor wife
without lawful cause, so long as the marital relation exists, can
they have established by
exclude the other from the home
45
mutual and voluntary choice."
The fallacy in the family unity theory has been noted by Professor
McCurdy, 46 who specifically attacked the Kelley case on this point.
Feeling that the denial of the wife's suit may do the reverse of bringing the parties closer together, McCurdy said, "There is no reason
to suppose that allowing actions causes discord more than would denying them." 47 Hence, it might be argued that the denial adds to the
breach by placing an additional thorn of discord in the side of possible future harmony.
In Owens48 the Delaware Supreme Court also discussed the family
unity theory and rejected the trial court's argument by saying that if
the denial of the suit placed an economic burden on the wife, thus
compelling her return to the marriage fold, the resulting reconciliation
would be forced at best and would be based on coercion rather than
the "love and affection" which society and the courts have in mind.
Finally, the validity of the family unity theory is open to criticism
from a practical standpoint. Almost all the cases, Kelley included,
would allow the wife to sue if divorced. 49 Since it appears that today a
divorce can be obtained if persistent effort is exerted, denying the
wife's suit may serve to destroy rather than preserve the home, for
the court is in effect requiring the wife to obtain a divorce in order to
gain exclusive possession of her property-a result that no family unity
doctrine enthusiast could possibly endorse. Also, such a delay in
At. at S15.
'5153
4
6McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses And Use During Marriage Of The
Matrimonial Home Owned By The Other, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 447 (1957).
'1 d. at 471.
48See note ix supra.
4"Also indicating that the wife may sue if the parties are divorced is Williams
v. Williams, io6 Neb. 584, 184 N.W. 114 (1921). See note 23 supra.

